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Abstract
This thesis aims to study the possible superior performance of Swedish com-
panies owned by Private Equity rms. This is achieved through constructing
a panel dataset consisting of portfolio companies of the ten largest Swedish
Private Equity rms and comparing their performance with companies de-
rived from a small cap stock market index. In our results, we nd indications
supporting an overperformance of the companies owned by a Private Equity
rm relative to the public benchmark. However, it is still di¢ cult to de-
rive the true explanatory variables explaining why this occurs and by which
magnitude the Private Equity companies overperform.
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I. Introduction
In this thesis we aim to contribute to the knowledge about private equity
(PE) performance in Sweden, where the presence of private equity has been
especially strong since the 2000s (SVCA homepage December 19 2017). De-
spite this, no research has been made about Swedish PE-performance since
Bergström, Grubb and Jonsson (2007), even though thorough research has
been made on the American market regularly since the 1980s. The majority
of the previous empirical research nd results indicating on a superior over-
performance of the PE-portfolio companies and funds relative to publicly
traded companies. However, this superior performance has been questioned
by later research. In order to investigate this on the Swedish market, we have
constructed a panel dataset. The dataset consists of 48 portfolio companies
from the ten largest Swedish PE-rms and 62 public companies from the
Swedish small cap stock index OMXXSCPI, sampled over the time period
2007-2016. Through performing three regressions using Return on Assets,
EBITDA margin and Return on Common Equity as dependent variables,
while controlling for leverage level and turnover, we will be able to examine
the operational performance of Swedish private equity portfolio companies
relative to the sampled publicly traded companies
The PE-industry has grown rapidly since the 1980s, but even though it is a
salient part of the everyday global business enterprise, there is only limited
understanding of the mechanisms of the PE-market. As a consequence, it
has been di¢ cult to draw any strong conclusions about the performance of
the PE-owned companies. The matter of uncertainty makes studies like this
important in order to raise the awareness on the subject of PE and its possi-
ble superior performance, which as a matter of fact has been questioned by
later research from the 2010s. The uncertainty of operational performance
of PE-owned companies was thoroughly underlined by Harris, Jenkinson and
Kaplan (2014). Even though their study showed tendencies on superior per-
formance of the PE-portfolio companies, Harris et al. (2014) remarked on
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the dramatic historic cycles of the PE-market. According to the researchers
themselves, this makes the performance results questionable as well as illus-
trates the limited understanding of the PE-industry. Similar to the results of
Harris et al. (2014) Kaplan and Sensoy (2015) and Guo, Hotchkiss and Song
(2011) also found positive results on average for the PE-portfolio companies
in their studies. However, they also question the theories and research made
on the PE-market since their results di¤er dramatically from the research
made in the 1980s.
Research on the superior performance of the PE-market during the 2000s
found that PE-owned companies overperformed relative to publicly traded
companies. Nevertheless, several studies were questioning what PE-rm
characteristics are able to explain this superior performance. For example,
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) thoroughly investigate the mechanisms derived
from the theories behind the superior operational performance of PE-owned
companies. The authors nd that PE-rms increased the performance of the
individual companies relative to publicly traded companies, however, they
did not necessarily exhibit superior performance. A strand of other Amer-
ican research on the possible superior performance of PE during the 2000s
came to the same conclusions, e.g. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Phalip-
pou and Gottschalg (2009). Furthermore, the same results were found on the
Swedish PE-market by Bergström et al. (2007). This research is unique since
the absolute majority of the research has been conducted on the American
market, using the S&P 500 as a public benchmark. Despite that Bergström
et al. (2007) also found evidence of PE overperformance on the Swedish
market, the authors likewise remark on the complexity of the PE-industry.
In short, they nd no key determinant explaining superior PE-performance,
which is in line with the approach of the American research during the 2000s.
It was during the 1980s that the PE-industry was properly culminated and
therefore studied for the rst time. As previously mentioned, the research of
2
PE-performance during the 1980s di¤er signicantly from studies made post
2000s. Kaplan (1989a) found dramatic superior operational performance
gain of at best 80.5% over the lifespan of the sampled PE-funds compared to
the S&P 500 (measured in net cash ows), and Smith (1990) found similar
results of 71% in operational performance gain. Several other studies from
the late 1980s and early 1990s support these ndings as well, e.g. Baker
and Wruck (1989) and Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990). Comparing the per-
formance results found in the 1980s with the ones of the 2010s, the dramatic
di¤erence and uncertainty brought up by researchers become comprehensible.
For example, Guo et al. (2011) nd a 14,3% performance gain (measured in
net cash ow) and Harris et al. (2014) an overperformance of 18% over the
lifetime of the PE-funds.
There are two conclusions to be drawn from previous research. (1) An in-
disputable majority of the research made from the 1980s until today nd
signs of private equity overperformance, although in varying degrees. This
was summarized by Cumming, Siegel and Wright (2007), stating that there
is a general consensus across di¤erent time periods, methodologies and mea-
sures that PE-ownership tends to enhance the operational performance of
the individual companies they own. However, there are still some empiri-
cal studies dismissing the idea of PE-rms achieving any type of superior
performance (Guo et al. 2011). It should also not be forgotten that some
of the PE-companies completely fail in creating superior performance and
go bankrupt (Jensen 1989). This excludes them from the research, making
the results slightly skewed. (2) The key determinants behind superior op-
erational performance of PE-companies are still not properly assessed. The
theories behind PE-performance determinants were introduced during the
boom of the PE-market in the 1980s by Jensen (1989), the same time as the
research of PE-performance was properly initiated. These theories are still
applied by researchers today, and are based on the PE-rms aptitude of three
di¤erent sets of changes in their acquired rms: Governance-, Financial- and
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Operational engineering (described in further detail below).
Measuring operational performance using three accounting measurements;
Return on Assets (RoA), EBITDA-margin and Return on Common Equity
(RoCE), we expect to nd overperformance of the sampled PE-companies
relative to the public benchmark, as in line with the results derived from
earlier research. In our results we nd signicant values supporting a po-
tential overperformance of PE-portfolio companies compared to the public
benchmark. However, it is di¢ cult to assert exactly which variables explain
this result and by what magnitude the PE-owned companies overperform,
which is also similar to the conclusions of earlier research. Furthermore,
an increase in turnover turned out to have a positive e¤ect on operational
performance, while leverage appeared to be negatively correlated with our
dependent variables.
With our results, this study contributes to the knowledge of PE-performance
on the Swedish market. Since Swedish research is scarce, and the latest study
was written ten years ago (Bergström et al. 2007), Swedish PE-performance
is currently a subject of great uncertainty. Also, no Swedish PE-study has
ever benchmarked against public companies, which has been done in the
majority of the PE-performance research, especially on the American market
(Harris et al. 2014, Kaplan & Strömberg 2009, Higson & Stucke 2012, Guo
et al. 2011, etc.).
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Firstly, we describe how the PE-
industry works and the di¤erent types of transactions they engage in. We also
provide a theoretical description. Thereafter, we describe the calibration and
choice of the econometric model, followed by our results. Then we discuss and
analyze our results and our research question in relation to previous empirical
studies. Lastly, we conclude by giving several suggestions for future research.
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1.1. Private Equity Firms
PE-rms consists of several investment advisors and professionals. With a
wide range of skills and expertise, these advisors analyze the di¤erent sectors
of the market for possible investment opportunities. The PE-rms manage
numerous PE-funds in order to realize these investments, in which they are
General Partners (GPs). Limited Partners (LPs) are investors committed
to provide a certain amount of capital to pay for the investments of the
PE-rm. Typical examples of these institutional investors are corporate and
public pension funds, wealthy individuals or insurance companies, which are
the ones providing the majority of the capital to the fund(s) (Kaplan &
Strömberg 2009).
It is custom that the PE-rms (GPs) contribute with 1 % of the total cap-
ital, and act as managers of the fund(s) and its investments (the di¤erent
portfolio companies) in which the LPs have a limited authority (Kaplan &
Strömberg 2009, Heed 2010, Kaplan & Schoar 2005). However, there are
general guidelines and basic covenants in the fund agreement that must be
followed by the GPs. Commonly, there are restrictions on how much capital
one portfolio company can be invested with or what kind of securities the
investment will be made in. Also, the fund itself typically has a xed life for
about ten years with the rst ve years to invest the funds capital and the
last ve years to return all of the LPs share of the capital.
The fund managersshare is composed of several di¤erent fees and interests.
A percentage of the committed capital is calculated as an annual management
fee as well as a percentage of the capital employed when the investments are
realized. Deal and monitoring fees are also a common way of PE-rms to
charge for their services, but the carried interest of 20 % of the earnings of
the fund is the biggest contribution to the GPs share (Kaplan & Strömberg
2009). This is why successful PE-rms can earn a substantial amount of
money from making successful private equity investments.
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1.2. Private Equity Transactions
There are many di¤erent kinds of PE-transactions, i.e. di¤erent strategies
and approaches of PE-rms to acquire companies to their funds. Type of
transaction depends on how the fund managers choose to nance the acquired
company. A leveraged buyout and a venture capital investment are the two
types of transactions being used in this study.
1.2.1 Leveraged Buyout and Venture Capital
A leveraged buyout (LBO) is commonly nanced with 60 to 90 % debt.
This high level of leverage is typically arranged by a bank since the debt
usually includes a senior or secured loan portion. The loan portion is today
commonly bought by the institutional investors (the LPs). The leverage is
used to cover the purchase of the majority of the companys equity and the
capital from the fund(s) is used to acquire the remaining percentage of the
purchase price (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009, Sahlman 1990). A critical part
of the LBO is therefore played by the leverage level of the target company
since its assets often are used as a security for the debt nancing.1
The structure and governance of a Venture Capital organization (VC) is very
similar to a PE-rm. The GP and LP relationship is of the same character-
istics were the VC act as GP, and their funds have the same xed life as
the PE-rms. There are however two major distinctions when it comes to
fees and the nancial structure of a VC transaction (Sahlman 1990). Firstly,
VCs seldom charge the portfolio companies but instead rather focuses on
the LPs. Second and most importantly, the maturity- and debt level of the
target rms is what above all di¤ers a VC transaction from a LBO. While
PE-rms use leverage to acquire the equity of a portfolio company during a
LBO, the VC use its fund of investments, which is due to the di¤erent choice
1Due to several tranches of debt and hence, the complexity of a leveraged buyout, most
of the research of LBOs ignore its nancial debt structure (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009,
Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg & Weisbach 2013), which is why this study also wont
examine it further.
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of acquired companies. VCs are targeting early stage companies, while LBOs
often consists of more mature companies with a high degree of debt capac-
ity. Targeting companies with a more modest growth rate and stable cash
ow are therefore more common in LBO transactions, relative to the tradi-
tional VC-model which focuses on companies with a high growth potential
(Sahlman 1990).
1.3. The Performance of Private Equity
Superioroperational performance of private equity companies compared to
other companies can be generated in numerous ways according to theory and
earlier research. Studies show that this creation of operational performance
is based on the PE-rms application of three di¤erent sets of changes in their
acquired companies: Governance-, Financial- and Operational engineering.
These three theories were introduced by Jensen (1989) when the research
about the PE-market were properly culminated and are still being used in
modern research.
1.3.1 Governance Engineering
One of the central aspects of Governance Engineering on the possible superior
value creation of PE-rms is the issue of Asymmetric Information. PE-
rms are expected to have superior information on future portfolio company
performance, which could imply consistent favorable portfolio performance.
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) points out that managers with a possibility
of closer monitoring will use this knowledge to deliver superior results, even
though this is a source of insider information according to private equity
critics.
Management stakes is also part of Governance Engineering theory, which is
said to facilitate both strategic and operational improvements of PE-portfolio
companies. Management stakes gives the portfolio company the opportunity
to reduce misalignment between management and shareholders incentives
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by increasing the managementsequity stake of the portfolio company. The
personal costs of ine¢ ciency and personal benets are thereafter expected to
be higher which could result in lower agency costs (reduced misalignment)
(Bergström, et al. 2007, Kaplan & Strömberg 2009, Kaplan 1989b, Jensen
1989). Governance Engineering also refer to how the PE-rms choose to
control the boards of their acquired company investments. The boards of PE-
portfolio companies are in general smaller than their publicly owned industry
peers and are on average meeting more frequently, creating a more e¤ective
bureaucracy (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009).
1.3.2 Operational Engineering
A great deal of organizational restructuring, known theoretically as Opera-
tional Engineering, takes place after a company is acquired by a PE-rm.
One measure of this form of engineering is cost reduction programs, which
are commonly incorporated in order to improve operational e¤ectiveness.
Enhanced operational e¤ectiveness is also said to be achieved by three other
changes: (1) reducing of or by repositioning working sta¤, (2) strengthen
or replacing the management sta¤ and (3) introducing corporate refocusing.
In fact, studies have shown that after a company is acquired by a PE-rm,
one-third of the CEOs are replaced within three months while two-thirds are
replaced during the rst four years (Acharya, Gottschalg, Hahn & Kehoe
2013). These measures of Operational Engineering are supposedly creating
better mechanisms of communication due to less bureaucracy and sharpened
strategic focus (Bergström et al. 2007, Kaplan & Strömberg 2009).
Bergström et al. (2007) introduces the matter of Parenting as one of the cen-
tral aspects of Operational Engineering. Parenting refers to the possibility
of the PE-rm o¤ering management and industry expertise to the current
management of the portfolio company in order to add value to their invest-
ments. In other words, a way to improve the performance of the portfolio
company. This is the reason why many of the PE-rms are industry focused
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and have their own base of employees of operational- and industry expertise
(Kaplan & Strömberg 2009).
1.3.3 Financial Engineering
The subject of Financial Engineering concerning PE-portfolio companies is
foremost related to the acquired companys leverage levels. Increased leverage
is in theory supposed to have a strong e¤ect on increased returns, a theorem
introduced by Modigliani & Miller (1958). Through increasing the debt of
the target company the managers will be pressured to reduce the free cash
owand make more optimal decisions, i.e., not waste money. Since higher
debt levels will increase the risk of bankruptcy, it is also a way to motivate
the management of the acquired portfolio company to work harder and more
e¢ ciently (Jensen 1989, Kaplan & Strömberg 2009, Axelson, Strömberg &
Weisbach 2013, Bergström et al. 2007). Further, the increased leverage in
LBOs creates the opportunity to interest tax deductions. These tax shields
may increase cash ows, making them available to the providers of capital
(Guo et al. 2011).
1.3.4 Other factors generating operational performance
Several other factors to achieve higher operational performance of PE-portfolio
companies have also been discussed in earlier research. For example, growth
potential of the acquired portfolio company, often measured in turnover, is
theorized to a¤ect the strategy of the PE-rm during and after the trans-
action (Berger & Udell 1998). Furthermore, the size of the PE-funds has
increased since the original boom of the PE-market during the 1980s, mak-
ing researchers interested in a possible correlation between fund size and
performance. Fund size is therefore a relatively common metric to use when
measuring performance (Harris et al. 2014, Lopez-de-Silances, Phalippou &
Gottschalg 2015).
Due to the xed life of a PE-fund, timing of exit is another important as-
pect of the LBOsand VCsinvestment process (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009,
9
Nowak, Knigge & Schmidt 2004, Axelson et al. 2013). This is closely linked
to the speculations about PE-rms taking advantage of arbitrage on the debt-
and equity market, which have given rise to theories about booms- and busts
in the PE-market. In short, this theory builds on misalignment between
the equity- and debt market, where mispricings makes the cost of debt low
relative to equity. In a scenario as such, PE-rms could borrow at a rate
lower than the given risk and thereby create value by borrowing (Kaplan &
Strömberg 2009, Acharya, Franks & Servaes 2007, Maeseneire & Brinkhuis
2012, Axelson et al. 2013). Private equity cyclicality implicitly means that
there will be more transactions and higher leverage levels in target companies
during times of low interest rates, concluding in more favourable results (i.e.
when debt markets are favourable).
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II. Calibration
2.1. Time frame, Independent variables and Operating metrics
Striving for comparability with earlier research (Bergström et al. 2007,
Higson & Stucke 2012), the time frame of choice is ten years (2007-2016).
Nevertheless, we chose to exclusively study the holding period of the PE-
transactions respectively and thereby using a less complicated event window
by not adding an extra six month observation post exit year.2
When selecting the metrics of operational performance and the independent
variables, we also strove for comparability with earlier research to create a
reliable analysis of the results. However, several of the measurements de-
rived from the theories of Governance- Operational and Financial Engineer-
ing are di¢ cult to value and measure accurately. They are also di¢ cult to
collect due to the severe lack of data availability. The PE-market exhibits
low transparency (Heed 2010), although, under Swedish law, all of the joint-
stock companies having any account made public need to deliver audited
annual reports to the Swedish Companies Registrations O¢ ce (see Årsre-
dovisninglag [1995:1554] 8 sec. 3 § and Bokföringslag [1999:1078] 6 sec. 2
§). Nevertheless it was still di¢ cult to sample independent variables since
many of them were either not available or would severely decrease the size of
our dataset. Initially, the aim was to investigate the e¤ects of management
stakes, leverage levels, fund size and turnover. This study will only measure
for the e¤ects of leverage levels and turnover as two of the possible explana-
tory variables3 to operational performance. Leverage measures how large a
companys debt is in relation to its equity, where a higher value implies on
higher debt. Turnover measures the amount of sales for the individual com-
pany. Also, a PE-dummy will be added which illustrates the di¤erence in
2Also, more recent studies occasionally use an event window with t-1 and t+1 (or t+2)
of the holding period in order to investigate the changes in operational performance from
public to private, which we chose not to do.
3For a description for these variables, please go to Appendix C.
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intercepts between the PE-portfolio companies and the benchmark consisting
of publicly traded companies.
After studying prominent research on the subject of operational performance
of PE-portfolio companies (Bergström et al. 2007, Guo et al. 2011, Kaplan
& Strömberg 2009, Axelson et al. 2013) our operational performance metrics
of choice are4:
 EBITDA-margin
 Return on Asset (RoA)
 Return on Common Equity (RoCE)
These will be used as dependent variables in three individual regressions.
EBITDA-margin, RoA and RoCE are expressed in percentage, where a higher
value indicates on a higher performance of the individual company. All of
the operating metrics as well as the independent variables were collected on
a yearly basis from the databases Retriever and Bloomberg.
2.2. Data collection
2.2.1 PE-dataset
When preceding the sampling of the PE-dataset, the main restriction of geo-
graphical emphasis on Sweden was set in order to limit the sample. Through
collecting solely Swedish private equity portfolio companies acquired from
Swedish PE-rms, this study is in line with the approach of Bergström et al.
(2007). Through considering the ten largest Swedish PE-rms, we manually
collected the dataset from sampling the completed PE-transactions during
the chosen event window (2007-2016). This originally resulted in a sample
of total 76 PE-transactions.
4For a description for these variables, please go to Appendix C.
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Certain adjustments of the rst raw dataset were deemed necessary to im-
prove the sample which implied that companies and specic years of data
had to be excluded for three reasons. Firstly, numerous measurements were
not available, which made it necessary to exclude those companies that did
not report any of the chosen operating metrics. Secondly, adjustments were
made to extremum values and individual years without any nancial ratios,
which were both excluded; we deemed these deviations signicant enough to
motivate this correction due to them being prominent anomalies and outliers.
Thirdly, we made the largest alternation to our PE-sample in order to raise
comparability with its benchmark in terms of sector. From observing the
di¤erent sector-weights in both the PE- and benchmark dataset, we decided
to exclude the sectors of Technology and Communications since these two
sectors were strongly represented in the benchmark, but rare among the PE-
companies. The two sectors of Financial and Real Estate companies were
also excluded due to extreme metrics.5
All of the adjustments concluded in a sample of 48 PE-portfolio companies
with no single PE-rm holding more than ten of these companies. This is
yet again in line with Bergström et al. (2007) who used 79 PE-transactions.
Similar size of PE-dataset has also been used by Acharya et al. (2013) and
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) with 59 and 43 PE-companies respectively.
The PE-dataset consists of two di¤erent PE-transactions; LBOs and VCs.
We do know that the majority of the PE-portfolio companies were acquired
by a PE-rm through an LBO, but we cannot tell with absolute certainty
how many or which ones.
Overall, the following four conditions were thereby set on the PE-portfolio
companies in order to be included in the dataset:
5The chosen accounting measures for Finance and Real Estate are not comparable with
other sectors.
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1. Private equity transaction performed by an Swedish PE-rm
2. The portfolio company had to be Swedish
3. Private equity transaction to be completed between 2007-2016 (acquisition
and exit)
4. Accounting data available for at least one of the operational metrics and all
of the explanatory variables
2.2.2 Benchmark dataset
We decided to use the companies consisting of the OMXXSCPI as a bench-
mark, which is a stock market index consisting of 88 small cap companies
noted on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. This benchmark was chosen in
order to achieve best possible comparability in the total dataset, where these
companies were found to be much more similar to our PE-portfolio compa-
nies in terms of size, liquidity and leverage than any other Swedish stock
market index. Besides economic intuition, the decision was also supported
by Higson and Stucke (2012) that criticized the frequent use of S&P 500
(or large cap stock market indices) as benchmarks in previous private equity
research (e.g. Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009; Harris et
al. 2014).
The same alteration on the benchmark dataset was performed in order to
raise comparability with the PE-dataset in terms of sector. As in the PE-
dataset, the sectors Technology, Communication, Financial and Real Estate
were excluded. The sectors of Energy and Utilities were also ruled out since
none of these were represented in the PE-dataset. After this adjustment, 62
benchmark companies remained.
After combining the two datasets, it resulted in a full sample consisting of
110 companies, as illustrated in Table I below.
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Table I: Total Dataset
PE Benchmark Total
48 62 110
This table shows the total amount of companies in the dataset
2.2.3 Critical evaluation
The lack of data availability as well as the exclusion of variables and years
could be seen as a possible selection bias in our PE-dataset. Observing both
sector and size of the excluded companies, we controlled for this. No specic
sector or neither larger or smaller companies were excluded to a larger extent
due to lack of data.
We also identify the choice of studying PE-portfolio companies as a possible
selection bias since these companies have been carefully selected by pro-
fessionals at PE-rms searching for investment opportunities. Despite that
this potentially can result in a upward bias for PE-owned companies in our
dataset, it is dismissed by Kaplan (1989a) as small. Further, survivorship
bias is another possible restriction to our dataset, i.e. a possible overestima-
tion of historical performance (Bergström et al. 2007). We are aware that the
PE-dataset is not necessary a representative comprehensive sample of the ex-
isting Swedish PE-market today since there are funds being closed and some
of the acquirements go bankrupt (Jensen 1989). These are not visible for us,
leaving the existing and often well performing funds and PE-transactions in
the forefront to investigate. Bergström et al. (2007) states that bankruptcy
is rare in Sweden and we are therefore not worried that survivorship bias will
severely skew our result.
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The choice of accounting measures as dependent variables could also serve
as a limitation for two reasons. (1) There are several ways of calculating
these metrics, making it possible to present favourable estimations for di¤er-
ent sectors respectively.6 (2) Accounting measurements regarding operating
metrics as RoA, EBITDA-margin and RoCE are considered to be sector spe-
cic. Even though the original dataset included 164 companies and over 1
200 observations, it was still not su¢ ciently large to control for di¤erences
in sectors. We managed to partially solve this issue through ensuring that
the sector-weights in our two datasets match each other as well as possible.
This was done in order to prevent the model from being biased from one of
the groups having a overrepresentation of a specic sector compared to the
other.
6EBITDA is also a non-general accepted accounting (GAAP) measurement, making
the estimated EBITDA even more fragile.
Furthermore, when investigating the performance of di¤erent companies, researchers
often choose between using e.g. EBITDA-margin and EBIT (earnings before interest and
taxations). Some argue that EBIT may be more appropriate to use when comparing
companies across di¤erent sectors. Nevertheless, since the majority of the research made
on the PE-market have been using EBITDA-margin, we chose to use the same approach.
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III. Methodology
After thoroughly investigating what methods previous empirical studies with
similar aim and research question have chosen, we came to the conclusion
that a regression using panel data is the most appropriate method. Since we
constructed an unbalanced panel dataset that contains repeated observations
of our chosen variables over the same units (our companies), collected over
our ten year time frame, this choice of method allows us to to consider both
cross-sectional changes between companies and changes over time (Verbeek
2012).
The aim of this thesis is to study the operational performance of Swedish
PE-owned companies compared to publicly traded companies. In order to
calibrate an econometric model tting this aim, the following three hypothe-
ses were stated:
H1 The operating performance of the private equity portfolio companies mea-
sured in Return on Assets (RoA) has improved during their holding period
compared to the public benchmark
H2 The operating performance of the private equity portfolio companies mea-
sured in EBITDA-margin has improved during their holding period compared
to the public benchmark
H3 The operating performance of the private equity portfolio companies mea-
sured in Return on Common Equity (RoCE) has improved during their hold-
ing period compared to the public benchmark
Further, controlling for two of the theories behind the superior operational
performance of PE-companies, we also included two variables that measure
leverage and turnover. Two additional hypotheses were therefore stated:
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H4 An increased leverage is associated with an improved operational perfor-
mance
H5 An increase in turnover is associated with an improved operational per-
formance
3.1. The Random E¤ects Model
Following the construction of the hypotheses, the calibration method of
choice in order to answer them were set to be a Random Generalised Least
Squares (GLS) e¤ects model (commonly regarded as just random e¤ects).
This resulted in an econometric model (1):
(1)OM = +1PEdummyi+2LeverageLevelit+3(log)Turnoverit+Uit+Eit
Where OM is one of the Operational Metrics (RoA, EBITDA-margin and
RoCE) and the PE-Dummy is the dummy variable for the 48 private equity
companies. The LeverageLevel as well as the (log)Turnover regressor are the
two independent and possible explanatory variables of choice when control-
ling for the e¤ects of operational performance. This equation has mainly been
inspired by Bergeström et al. (2007) regarding the choice of time window,
application of accounting data and dependent variables.
When interpreting the coe¢ cients of a random e¤ect regression, the beta ()-
values are a matrix-weighted average of the between and within estimators.
The beta-values therefore include both the within-company and between-
company e¤ects. An interpretation of a  is therefore the average e¤ect of
the variable x over y when x changes across time and between companies
with one unit. Considering that several other possible variables of interest
is not included in the model, we will in our results be more interested in
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the direction (positive or negative) and signicance level of our coe¢ cients
rather than the actual estimated value of each parameter.
Justifying the choice of Random GLS e¤ects model was done through per-
forming the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM)-test that conrmed
that a Random GLS e¤ect model was of correct choice, with a Prob> chibar2
of 0.00 for all the regressions. The choice between Random- and Fixed ef-
fects model was not decided through the standard of the Hausman-test, but
instead on the basis of our model containing a time invariant variable (the
PE-dummy). Also after performing a Whites test, the standard errors were
corrected for heteroskedasticity.
3.2. Descriptive Statistics
Table II shows the correlations for the variables used in the model, excluding
the dummy variable. Please observe that the matrix shows correlation values
for both the treatment and the benchmark group. As expected, the three
dependent variables all exhibit positive correlation with each other, while
the strongest can be found between RoA and RoCE. Turnover and Leverage
appears to be weakly negatively correlated with both RoA and RoCE. Be-
sides that, the rest of the variables in the combined dataset shows a positive
correlation in di¤erent degrees.7
7Even though RoA and RoCE exhibit a very strong positive correlation, we chose to
still use both of the variables in our regressions in order to use the same approach as earlier
research.
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Table II: Correlation matrix
EBITDA-margin RoA RoCE Turnover Leverage
EBITDA-margin 1
RoA 0.6402 1
RoCE 0.5569 0.9236 1
Turnover 0.0325 -0.0227 -0.0334 1
Leverage 0.0016 -0.0266 -0.0383 0.1667 1
This table shows the Correlation matrix of both the dependent and independent
variables in our model.
Further, Table III shows the average and the median values for the three
dependent variables in the dataset for the PE-rms and the Benchmark.
Table III : Average and Median values of the dependent variables
EBITDA-margin RoA RoCE
Average Median Average Median Average Media
PE 0.088 0.094 0.038 0.032 0.117 0.100
Non-PE 0.052 0.062 0.022 0.034 0.042 0.073
This table shows the average and median values of all three dependent variables
in both the PE and Non-PE (public benchmark) dataset.
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Even though we excluded the most extreme values from the dataset, the
average between the two groups still deviate slightly from each other. In
other studies, it is therefore more common to focus on the median. When
doing so, one can observe that the two groups have more similar values,
despite that the PE-portfolio companies exhibit higher median values for
EBITDA margin and RoCE. In Appendix D we have also included three
graphs that illustrates the distribution of these dependent variables in our
dataset.
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IV. Result
In Table IV the GLS Random E¤ects regressions for all three dependent
variables are presented in three regressions respectively.
At the end of the table, the measurement rho () is stated. Rho shows
the fraction of the variance in the error due to the individual-specic e¤ect,
known as the intra-class correlation. If rho approaches 1, then the between
specic e¤ects dominate the idiosyncratic error. Being larger than 0.50, all
of the regressions are not completely idiosyncratic, i.e. most of the variation
is not explained by individual specic e¤ects but in between e¤ects. For
example, the intra-class correlation for EBITDA-margin is 0,755, meaning
that 75,5% of the variation in the regressors are explained by the variation
between all of the 104 companies, while 24,5% of the variation is explained
by the individual companys change over time (within-e¤ect). This result is
in line with our approach since we want to investigate the di¤erences between
the two groups of companies and not the individual companieschange over
time. However, the values of sigma U (u) and sigma E (e), does not exhibit
large di¤erences in any of the three regressions, suggesting that there is some
degrees of unexplained variation in the dependent variables, both in between-
and in within e¤ects.
Also presented in Table IV are three di¤erent types of R-squared; within,
between and overall variation. We nd that EBITDA margin and RoCE re-
gressions have similar between- and overall R-squared values, indicating on a
somewhat higher explanatory power than in the RoA regression. Also, N rep-
resents the number of observations while n states the number of companies.
These numbers turned out to be very similar over all three regressions.
From observing the parameters, the overall picture is that each coe¢ cient
is signicant and in the same direction across all three dependent variables,
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using a ratio of signicance of 0.01> p < 0.05 > p < 0.1. As expected, the
coe¢ cient values for RoCE is stronger in magnitude than for RoA. This is
due to the fact that RoA is calculated with the individual rms total assets
(debt and equity), in the denominator, when RoCE only has the equity in
the denominator.
Starting with the variable log(Turnover), we observe that an increase in
turnover has a positive signicant e¤ect on operating performance in all three
regressions. This result was expected and conrms Hypothesis 5. In all of
the three regressions, the parameter of LeverageLevel indicates that higher
debt has a strong signicant negative e¤ect on the levels of operating perfor-
mance for all companies. Therefore, it is not possible to conrm Hypothesis
4, which states that an increased leverage is expected to have a positive ef-
fect on our chosen dependent variables. We tried estimating another model
regarding the theories about leverage in relation to PE-companies. Through
including an interaction-variable of the PE-dummy and LeverageLevel, we
isolated the possible e¤ect leverage might have had on the two di¤erent com-
pany groups separately. This model did not turn out signicant, dismissing
the interaction term completely.
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Table IV: GLS random e¤ects result
Return on Assets EBITDA-margin Return on Common Equity
PE 0.036** 0.068*** 0.105***
(0.018) (0.024) (0.036)
Leverage -0.160*** -0.083*** -0.249***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.060)
Log(Turnover) 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.034***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Constant -0.140*** -0.350*** -0.277**
(0.050) (0.075) (0.100)
N 601 672 599
n 99 104 99
R2 within 0.086 0.054 0.041
R2 between 0.040 0.110 0.110
R2 overall 0.032 0.069 0.062
u 0.077 0.118 0.156
e 0.066 0.067 0.149
 0.576 0.755 0.520
This table reports GLS random e¤ects regressions where the dependent variable
is operational performance - as measured by RoA, EBITDA-margin and RoCE -
and the explanatory variables of turnover and leverage. See Appendix C for
detailed explanations of all the variables. Standard errors are reported in
brackets. This table also shows the estimated R2, rho, and sigmas. ***, ** and *
denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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The PE-dummy, which illustrates the mean di¤erence of our three depen-
dent variables of the private equity-portfolio companies and the benchmark
group consisting the public companies, is the most important parameter in
this study. The PE-dummy is both positive and signicant, indicating that
the PE-portfolio companies actually did perform better than our benchmark.
This movement of the beta-values are consistent throughout all three regres-
sions, which thereby conrms Hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 and can best answer our
research question regarding the performance of private equity on the Swedish
market.
In order to test the robustness of the result, we ran several other regressions
with di¤erent variable combinations. In all of these regressions, the coe¢ -
cients remained in the same direction as in Table IV. This was true even if
we ran a simple regression or any other possible combination of the indepen-
dent variables. We also tested these di¤erent combinations with Pooled OLS
regressions and through including the extremum values and sectors from the
original dataset of 1 200 observations.8 We therefore believe that our result in
Table IV is robust. Furthermore, we also tested for multicollinearity through
using a variance ination factor (VIF) command in STATA. We could there-
after conclude that our result does not have a problem with multicollinearity.
8Please nd these regression outputs in the Appendix.
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V. Conclusion and Discussion
5.1. Performance of Swedish Private Equity
In this thesis, our aim was to contribute to the knowledge about private
equity performance in Sweden through investigating the possibility of supe-
rior operational performance of PE-portfolio companies relative to a public
benchmark. As previously mentioned, this is a subject addressed with un-
certainty in later research. Performing three regressions of the GLS Random
E¤ects Model using panel data, accounting for leverage level and turnover,
our results showed signicant signs indicating on overperformance of the
sampled PE-companies compared to the publicly traded benchmark.
We showed that an increase in turnover had a positive and signicant e¤ect
on our three operational metrics. Several other studies have in di¤erent ways
included turnover growth in their analysis (Bergström et al 2007, Berger &
Udell 1998). In accounting terms, an increase in turnover is often a positive
indication for the well being of a company. It suggests, for example, that the
companys goods are either sold in stores or used in production. This result
on our operational metrics was therefore not surprising.
Leverage appeared to have a signicant negative e¤ect on all three depen-
dent variables, indicating that an increase in debt is associated with reduced
operating metrics. This result was not expected since a higher debt level
is theorized to motivate the management of the acquired portfolio company
to work harder and more e¢ ciently (Jensen 1989). However, investigating
leverage levels as a determinant to higher operational performance on the
PE-market9 has showed varied results in earlier research. While Maeseneire
and Brinkhuis (2012) amongst others nd that higher levels of leverage corre-
late with higher operational performance, there are still research nding the
opposite conclusion, e.g. Axelson et al. (2013) and Kaplan and Strömberg
9This e¤ect of leverage is also theorized to positively a¤ect companies in general
(Modigliani & Miller 1958).
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(2009). Also, Bergström et al. (2007) could not nd any signicant e¤ect on
the inuence of leverage when measured in EBITDA-margin on the Swedish
market. Guo et al. (2011) theory about the changes in PE-transaction
mechanisms could possibly explain why leverage may have a di¤erent e¤ect
on operational performance of the PE-market today than in the 1980s. This
can at least partially explain why earlier studies such as Jensen (1989) and
Kaplan (1989a) found positive e¤ects on leverage. With this in mind it is
not strange that we found a negative e¤ect from increased leverage in our
sample. Therefore, we cannot fully assert what e¤ect leverage truly has on
operational performance of PE-portfolio companies, even though our fourth
hypothesis was rejected.
Our three main hypotheses, and overall research question regarding the supe-
rior performance of PE-portfolio companies, was answered through observing
the estimated PE-dummy in our regressions. The parameter turned out to
be both positive and signicant for all three operating metrics. This suggests
that the PE-portfolio companies actually did overperform the public bench-
mark on the Swedish market, which is in line with several empirical studies
performed in the American market (Kaplan & Schoar 2005, Higson & Stucke
2012, Harris et al. 2014, Guo et al. 2011). As mentioned earlier, we can-
not however state how much the PE-companies did overperform the public
benchmark since the explanatory variables are too few. It is not economically
intuitive to expect an e.g. 10 % overperformance in RoCE just from includ-
ing the e¤ect of leverage ratio and turnover. In other words, it is possible
that if we had been able to include variables such as management stakes,
industry and fund size, the parameter value of the PE-dummy could have
dropped. Therefore, stating that we nd a 10 % increase in the operational
performance of PE-companies is not a realistic conclusion. Nevertheless,
through observing the direction of the coe¢ cients and their signicance-level
respectively, it provides an overall picture of the possible overperformance.
Although not the economically sensible degree of it.
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Still, through placing our results of PE-overperformance in relation to pre-
vious empirical research, a couple of interesting observations can be drawn.
Starting from Jensen (1989) and Kaplan (1989a) until the latest research like
Higson and Stucke, (2012) Harris et al. (2014) among others, it is possible to
state that the vast majority of the studies nd signs of PE-overperformance
relative to a public benchmark. Despite that the degree of overperformance
has decreased over the years, the overall picture of overperformance is quite
similar. Our thesis therefore contributes to the existing research through
also presenting results indicating on a PE-overperformance on the Swedish
market. At the same time, our study as well rejects the briey mentioned
research claiming that there is no overperformance of PE-companies at all
(Guo et al. 2011).
Even though our result is in line with much of the previous research, we still
do not know why this is occuring. In other words, the problem of quantify-
ing the theories regarding superiorprivate equity performance presented
by Jensen (1989) still remains. As a consequence, we cannot derive the true
explanatory factors, or key determinants, that best explain the overperfor-
mance relative to the benchmark consisting of public companies. This has
also been a commonly encountered issue in the majority of the previous re-
search (Bergström et al. 2007, Higson & Stucke 2012, Cumming et al. 2007,
Harris et al. 2014 etc.).
One factor that we completely excluded from our regression was the e¤ect of
risk. This, since Harris et al. (2014) and Higson and Stucke (2012) underlined
the complexity of correctly acknowledging the risks of the PE-market, or
measuring it. Still, if we theoretically account for the risks involved in
PE-markets it might, at least intuitively, answer why researcher so often nd
a PE-overperformance relative to public markets. Assume that an investor
has two choices; either to invest in a PE-fund or a public stock market index.
Considering the highly illiquid nature of the PE-investment (the commitment
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risk), it seems economically sensible that an investment in PE yields some sort
of premium relative to public markets (Higson & Stucke 2012). Therefore,
we observe that PE-portfolio companies tend to outperform publicly traded
companies. Nevertheless, this is a pure speculation, and we have yet to
see any research article that thoroughly address these types of risks in PE-
investments.
Considering the risks of the PE-market, it is important to acknowledge that
the private equity industry is still very young and under a constant change
(Higson & Stucke 2012). The returns and behaviour of PE-rms has also been
proven to be very cyclical (Kaplan & Strömberg 2009, Nowak et al. 2004,
Axelson et al. 2013). Since PE is proven to exhibit macroeconomic cyclical
inuence, connecting our results to specical market changes in Sweden could
possibly make our interpretation more thorough. For example, Sweden has
during our chosen time period experienced both the global nancial crisis
2008-2009 and the Euro crisis. Therefore, placing our- or any other study
out of its historical context should be done with caution since conclusions
about returns, deriving explanatory variables or any other factor regarding
PE-rms can possibly be highly dependent on what country or which year
that the data is collected from.
The main nding of this study is thereby that there is a high probability
of overperformance by PE-companies relative to public companies. How-
ever, it seems to be very cyclical and time dependent, and it should not
be forgotten that the downfalls in the PE-market are not observed in the
performance research, making the conclusions possibly slightly skewed. The
key determinants behind this overperformance as well as the magnitude of
the overperformance cannot be determined, which, speculatively, also may
be the reason behind the possible continuing overperformance.
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5.2. Future research
In this study we constructed the sector weights for both the PE-portfolio
companies and the benchmark. This was performed in order to increase
comparability between the groups and to prevent a sector bias in our complete
sample. Although, it would have been interesting to actually control for
di¤erences in sectors. In order to do so, the sample size had to be increased,
which can be di¢ cult since data for PE-transactions is so scarce. During
this thesis process, we encountered the Argentum Centre for Private Equity,
which is a research centre focused on PE, based at the Norwegian School
of Economics in Bergen. Argentum has a database that contains all the
PE-transactions in the Nordic region. We strongly recommend that future
research try to access their database in order to obtain a su¢ ciently large
sample size, and therefore be able to control for what sectors or industries
the companies are active in, which has been shown to have an e¤ect in other
studies (Kaplan 1989a). From the Argentum database, it is also possible to
di¤er from what type of transaction that has been done, i.e, either a LBO or
a VC. This is interesting since much of the empirical studies actually di¤ers
between these two transactions that PE-rms engage in (Guo et al 2011).
Another interesting task for future private equity research on the Swedish
market is to use the method of Public Market Equivalent (PME) introduced
by Kaplan and Schoar (2005). With the PME-method it is possible to com-
pare how much a PE-fund investor earned with what the investor could have
earned from a equivalent investment in the public market (in the case of
Kaplan and Schoar, the S&P 500). This method has, in our best knowl-
edge, only been tested on American data (Higson & Stucke 2012, Harris et
al. 2014). Therefore the application of PME on the Swedish market could
serve to ll a research gap about PE-performance when benchmarked on,
for example, the OMX30 Stockholm. In order for this to be possible, the
researcher rst needs to have access to actual cash ow data from the funds
that the PE-rms use to nance their investments.
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5.3. Final reection
Due to the secretive nature of PE-rms, every possible explanatory factor
is of interest. New research of the Swedish PE-market is indeed both much
welcomed and needed. We would like to nish this thesis by reminding once
again of how strong the presence of the PE-industry actually is in Sweden.
In fact, there are currently over 800 Swedish companies owned by a PE-rm,
which employs around 4 % of the domestic labor force (SVCA, homepage,
December 19 2017). Also, as previously mentioned, the most important
institutional investors in PE-funds are e.g pension funds and insurance com-
panies. In other words, the PE-industry is here to stay and we are all, at
least in some way, a¤ected by it. Therefore, it is in our best interest to know
how the portfolio companies are performing.
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Appendix
A. Econometric Assumptions
By using a General least squares (GLS) Random e¤ects regression model, we
are making four major assumptions:
1. Unrelated e¤ects. Individual-specic e¤ects are random variables that
are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables of all periods of time
(past, current and future) of the same individual. This means that
there is no correlation between the chosen independent variables and
the error term. E[UijXit] = 0
2. E¤ect variance. There is constant variance of the individual specic ef-
fects. This means that the correlation between any observations for the
same individual is the same and equals to rho (), i.e. the rst and last
observation for a company has the same correlation as between the rst
and second. This is often called exchangeable or uniform correlation.
3. Identiability. All of the regressors are not perfectly collinear, does not
have zero variance and does not have many outliers.
4. The  is uncorrelated with all of the regressors.
B The Random E¤ects (RE) regression
 (1) Y =  + 1X1i + 2X2it + 3X3it + Uit + Eit
 (a)RoA = +1PEdummyi+2LeverageLevelit+3 log(Turnover)it+
Uit + Eit
 (b) EBITDA m arg in = + 1PEdummyi + 2LeverageLevelit +
3 log(Turnover)it + Uit + Eit
 (c)RoCE = +1PEdummyi+2LeverageLevelit+3 log(Turnover)it+
Uit + Eit
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The PE-dummy controls for the treatment group (private equity compa-
nies). This means that the LeverageLevel-regressor controls for the relation
between the two sets of companiesleverage levels e¤ect on their operational
performance. The logged variable Turnover also estimates both the PE-
and public companiessize-e¤ect on their operational performance. The U-
term represents the between company-errors, while the E-term the within
company-errors.
Since we are investigating the di¤erent companiesbehaviour across time as
well as the cross sectional di¤erences between companies consisting of two
di¤erent types of entities, we have to use the Random E¤ects regression to
compute our econometric estimate due to the dummy-variable. If we would
use a Fixed-e¤ects panel data regression instead of the random e¤ects model,
we would not be able to use the dummy. Since the majority of previous
theses have used the Pooled OLS option rather than panel regressions of
xed or random e¤ects, we performed a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier
(LM)-test. All of the individual regressions of the three dependent variables
(EBITDA-margin, RoA and RoCE) showed that we should use a random
e¤ects model. The usual Pooled OLS can give consistent estimators of j, but
as its standard errors ignore the positive serial correlation in the composite
error term, they will be incorrect, as will the usual test statistics.
When interpreting the coe¢ cients, the beta-values are a matrix-weighted av-
erage of the between and within estimators. The beta-values therefore include
both the within-company and between-company e¤ects. An interpretation
of e.g. B3 is the average e¤ect of Leverage over RoA when Leverage changes
across time and between companies with one unit.
C. Operating metrics and other variable equations
EBITDA-margin=EBITDATotal Revenue
EBITDA margin is a common metric to use when evaluating the operating
protability and cash ow of a company. It consists of EBITDA (Earnings
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) divided by Total Rev-
enue, and therefore gives a companys operating performance in percentage.
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RoA=Net IncomeTotal Assets
Return on Assets (RoA) gives investors an indication of how protable a
company is in relation to its total assets.
RoCE = (Net Income - Preferred Dividends)  Common Equity
Return on Common Equity (RoCE) is equal to the amount on net income
returned as a percentage of the common equity.
Leverage-level ratio = Total Debt  (Total Equity + Total Debt)
This leverage ratio illustrates how large a companys Total Debt is in relation
to its Total Equity. Through having (Total Equity + Total Debt) in the
denominator, this ratio varies between 0 and 1. A value of 0 implies that
the individual company has zero debt, and increases as the company take on
more debt.
log(Turnover) = log(sales of the individual rm)
Turnover with a log specication.
PE-dummy
A dummy variable where the value 1 implies that the company is owned by
a Private Equity rm.
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D. Distribution of Operating Metrics
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Graph I: Distribution of EBITDA-margin
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E. Robustness Checks
Table V: Robustness checks - Pooled OLS regressions
Return on Assets EBITDA-margin Return on Common Equity
PE 0.028*** 0.048*** 0.094***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018)
Leverage -0.057*** -0.045** -0.141***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.004)
Log(Turnover) 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.030**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Constant -0.137*** -0.183*** -0.270***
(0.038) (0.044) (0.076)
N 601 672 599
R2 (adj) 0.039 0.065 0.061
This table reports Pooled OLS regressions where the dependent variable is
operational performance - as measured by RoA, EBITDA-margin and RoCE -
and the explanatory variables of turnover and leverage. Standard errors are
reported in brackets. This table also shows the estimated adjusted R2. ***, **
and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table VI: Robustness checks. Random E¤ects - Return on Assets
RoA Check 1 Check 2 Check 3
PE 0.028* 0.020
(0.016) (0.017)
Leverage -0.129*** -0.153***
(0.039) (0.027)
Log(Turnover) 0.018*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.091*** -0.118** -0.129**
(0.026) (0.053) (0.055)
N 603 601 607
n 99 99 99
R2 within 0.0689 0.0865 0.0068
R2 between 0.0001 0.0234 0.0620
R2overall 0.0430 0.0185 0.0260
u 0.080 0.077 0.077
e 0.060 0.066 0.069
 0.587 0.577 0.552
This table reports GLS random e¤ects regressions where the dependent variable
is RoA and the explanatory variables of turnover and leverage (used in di¤erent
combinations in order to test for robustness). Standard errors are reported in
brackets. This table also shows the estimated R2, rho, and sigmas. ***, ** and *
denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table VII: Robustness checks, Random E¤ects - EBITDA-margin
EBITDA-margin Check 1 Check 2 Check 3
PE 0.057** 0.063***
(0.025) (0.024)
Leverage -0.055** -0.079***
(0.026) (0.026)
Log(Turnover) 0.032*** 0.029***
(0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.067*** -0.309*** -0.356***
(0.022) (0.073) (0.074)
N 672 672 676
n 104 104 104
R2 within 0.0120 0.0541 0.0345
R2 between 0.0288 0.0458 0.1250
R2overall 0.0226 0.0279 0.0652
u 0.120 0.121 0.117
e 0.068 0.067 0.067
 0.760 0.760 0.751
This table reports GLS random e¤ects regressions where the dependent variable
is EBITDA-margin and the explanatory variables of turnover and leverage (used
in di¤erent combinations in order to test for robustness). Standard errors are
reported in brackets. This table also shows the estimated R2, rho, and sigmas.
***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table VIII: Robustness checks, Random E¤ects - Return on Common
Equity
RoCE Check 1 Check 2 Check 3
PE 0.097*** 0.087**
(0.037) (0.035)
Leverage -0.190*** -0.235***
(0.058) (0.061)
Log(Turnover) 0.033*** 0.024***
(0.008) (0.008)
Constant 0.140*** -0.220** -0.276**
(0.040) (0.109) (0.109)
N 601 599 605
n 99 99 99
R2 within 0.0320 0.0410 0.0056
R2 between 0.0270 0.0484 0.1168
R2overall 0.0240 0.0241 0.0430
u 0.165 0.161 0.155
e 0.149 0.149 0.151
 0.549 0.541 0.513
This table reports GLS random e¤ects regressions where the dependent variable
is RoCE and the explanatory variables of turnover and leverage (used in di¤erent
combinations in order to test for robustness). Standard errors are reported in
brackets. This table also shows the estimated R2, rho, and sigmas. ***, ** and *
denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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F. PE portfolio companies
PE-rm Company Sector
EQT Atos Medical AB Health Care
EQT AcadeMedia AB Consumer Services
EQT Dometic Group AB Consumer Discretionary
EQT Granngården AB Consumer Discretionary
EQT TitanX Holding AB Consumer Discretionary
Priveq El-Björn AB Industrials
Priveq MYBW AB Consumer Discretionary
Priveq Mediplast AB Health Care
Priveq Silex Microsystems AB Industrials
Priveq Unisport Scandinavia AB Industrials
Priveq San Sac AB Industrials
Priveq Carmel Pharma AB Health Care
Priveq Assemblin Ventilation AB Industrials
Procuritas TPPG AB Materials
Procuritas Däckia AB Consumer Discretionary
Procuritas Osby Glas AB Consumer Discretionary
Accent Scandic Hotels AB Consumer Discretionary
Accent RenoNorden AB Industrials
Accent Mont Blanc Industri AB Consumer Discretionary
Accent ÅR Packaging AB Materials
Accent Bergteamet AB Materials
Accent Hööks Hästtransport AB Consumer Discretionary
Accent Autotube AB Consumer Discretionary
Accent Troax AB Industrials
Accent Crem International AB Industrials
Accent Flextrus AB Industrials
Credelity Qleanair Scandinavia AB Industrials
Nordic Capital Nefab Packaging Sweden AB Materials
Nordic Capital Thule Sweden AB Consumer Discretionary
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Litorina Ocay Sverige AB Consumer Discretionary
Litorina Sveba-Dahlén AB Industrials
Litorina Grolls AB Consumer Discretionary
Litorina Eton AB Consumer Discretionary
Litorina Semantix Tolkjouren AB Consumer Discretionary
Litorina Textilia Tvätt och Textilservice AB Consumer Discretionary
Litorina Pahlén AB Industrials
Ratos Biolin Scientic AB Health Care
Ratos EuroMaint Rail AB Industrials
Ratos Mobile Climate Control Sverige AB Industrials
Ratos Flokk AB Consumer Discretionary
Segulah Etraveli AB Consumer Discretionary
Segulah Scan Coin AB Consumer Discretionary
Segulah Kronans Droghandel Apotek AB Health Care
Segulah Skandinavisk Kommunalteknik AB Industrials
Valedo Akademikliniken HJ AB Health Care
Valedo Perten Instruments AB Industrials
Valedo Nytida Solhaga Sverige AB Health Care
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G. OMXXSCPI (benchmark) companies
Company Sector
Mr. Green Co AB Consumer Discretionary
Alligator Bioscience Health Care
NGS Group Consumer Discretionary
Saniona AB Health Care
Christian Berner Trade Tech AB Consumer Discretionary
Bactiguard Holding AB Health Care
NeuroVive Health Care
Arctic Paper Materials
Sportamore Publ AB Consumer Discretionary
Episurf Medical AB Health Care
Boule Diagnostics Health Care
Moberg Pharma Health Care
Dedicare Consumer Discretionary
MQ Holding AB Consumer Discretionary
Electra Gruppen Consumer Discretionary
GHP Special Care Health Care
C-Rad Health Care
Endomines AB Materials
Odd Molly Consumer Discretionary
CellaVision AB Health Care
Wise Group AB Consumer Discretionary
Rejlerkoncernen Consumer Discretionary
Uniex Consumer Discretionary
BE Group AB Materials
MedCap Health Care
Swedol Consumer Discretionary
NOTE AB Industrials
RNB Retail & Brands publ Consumer Discretionary
BioInvent International Health Care
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Studsvik AB Industrials
Feelgood Svenska Health Care
Beijer Electronics Industrials
Duroc Industrials
Poolia Consumer Discretionary
Midsona Health Care
CTT Systems AB Industrials
Malmbergs Elektriska Consumer Discretionary
ProlGruppen Industrials
Venue Retail Consumer Discretionary
Consilium Industrials
Björn Borg Consumer Discretionary
Trention Consumer Discretionary
Lammhults Design Consumer Discretionary
Semcon AB Consumer Discretionary
Svedbergs i Dalstorp Consumer Discretionary
SinterCast AB Industrials
Rottneros AB Materials
Viking Supply Ships Industrials
Icta Consumer Discretionary
KABE Consumer Discretionary
Bergs Timber Materials
Bong AB Materials
Concordia Maritime Industrials
Elos Health Care
Active Biotech Health Care
XANO Industri Industrials
Avega Group Consumer Discretionary
StjärnaFyrkant Consumer Discretionary
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